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THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
BURTON D. FRETZ*

Tribal Indians represent the original American minority group.
They are few in number, unfamiliar in character, and often foreign
in language. The thought of a minority group almost automatically
invokes the image of the Constitution of the United States, holding
its miraculous powers for the protection of those minorities.
For an Indian, however, the Constitution has two sets of civil
rights: one set exists between himself and the white men, the other
between himself and his tribe. This Article focuses on the latter
area. It begins by questioning what magic the Constitution has
worked in the past on intra-tribal affairs; it concludes by delineating areas of tribal action demanding the imposition of more constitutional restrictions from those areas where restrictions may be
imposed only with restraint.
Indian citizens of the United States occupy a unique status
within the larger American culture. They have lived on the North
American Continent longer than any other ethnic group; as a
political group they have shown no organized hostility toward the
national government for over seventy-five years. Yet, the privileges of national citizenship were withheld from persons of Indian
blood until 1924.1 Several states until 1948 denied the elective
franchise to Indians living on reservations and the validity of the
Indian vote is still not free from challenge.2 Even today the Indian
presents an easy target for distorting associations; popular literature tends to identify the modern Indian with primitive customs
which passed away with his ancestors.'
While some of his ancient customs have disappeared, the Indian
himself has not. Today the American Indian population exceeds
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 43 Stat. 253 (1924), 8 U.S.C. §1401(a)(2) (1964).
2. These restrictions were finally removed by judicial rather than legislative fiat.
Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948) ; Trujillo v. Garley (Dist. Ct.
New Mexico 1948) (unreported). Indians are now entitled to the same state social
services which other state citizens receive. Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C.
Cir. 1945). See also Shepardson, Navajo Ways in Government 119 n.4. (Memoir No.
96, American Anthropology Association 1963). The right of reservation Indians to
vote in state elections was challenged unsuccessfully
70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962).
3. E.g., Business Week, Sept. 23, 1964, p. 74.

in 1962. Montoya v.

Bolack,
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one-half million people, including 100,000 who do not speak
English. Approximately 100,000 of these people, however, are
persons of Indian ancestry who no longer live on a federal reserve
and, because they are legally indistinguishable from other American citizens, are not considered "Indians" for purposes of this
Article.
Supplementing the cultural separation of Indians from the mainstream of American life is the special political status afforded them
under federal Indian law. From early in the nineteenth century the
courts looked upon Indian tribes as independent nations whose inherent power within federally designated reservation areas was
subject only to the power of Congress to regulate their external
relations, for example, their power to declare war." Eventually
the courts recognized the power of Congress to pass the Major
Crimes Act which created federal jurisdiction over certain felonies
committted by Indians, and the power to terminate tribal status.'
Although Congress is thought to hold plenary power over Indian
affairs, the basis of this power has never been defined,7 and Congress has used its authority sparingly. This has left vast areas of
Indian matters subject only to the "unextinguished sovereignty" of
tribal governments since the states normally have neither criminal
nor civil jurisdiction over Indians for matters arising within
reservations.
[Tribal sovereignty] includes the power of an Indian tribe to adopt
and operate under a form of government of the Indians' choosing,
to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic
4. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations for 1966 of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 732 (1966).
5. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)

515 (1832).

6. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), upholds 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964):
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter,
rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon,
arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, shall be
subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any
of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
The offense of embezzlement of tribal funds was made a federal crime in 1956. 18
U.S.C. § 1163 (1964).
7. Comment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 285.
8. Alexander Bird-in-the-Ground v. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 239 F. Supp.
981 (D. Mont. 1965). Four states have taken jurisdiction of Indian affairs under a
special provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1964). Hearings on S. 961-68 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 241 (1965).
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relations of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy
taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to
control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, and to
administer justice. 9

The judicial power of an Indian tribe rests in one of three kinds
of Indian courts: (1) a court of Indian offenses, in which judges
are Indians appointed by the Secretary of the Interior and procedural rules have been drafted by the Secretary; (2) a tribal
court, in which judges are chosen under tribal law and written rules
have been approved by the Secretary, and (3) a traditional court,
which functions only in each of the Rio Grande pueblos, with procedures which are relatively unknown to outsiders. Hereafter, all
three kinds of tribunals will be classed under the heading "tribal
courts."
Criminal jurisdiction exists in each tribal court over members of
the tribe subject to the limitations of the Major Crimes Act.'0
Prosecutions are left to the tribal court for violations of local
regulations, misdemeanors, and certain felonies including the re9. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1942).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964). Is federal jurisdiction exclusive under the act? The
clause, "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, may refer (1) to "all
other persons," which the clause immediately follows, or (2) to the Indian offenses
in the section generally. The presence of the final comma infers the former. See note 6
supra. But if the Congress intended the former meaning, why did it fail to mention
exclusive jurisdiction when it subsequently dealt with embezzlement of tribal funds in
18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1964) ? Or is the crime of embezzlement such that Congress would
allow a tribe to punish an embezzler although it would not allow a tribe to punish a
burglar or robber?
United States v. Whaley, 37 Fed. 145 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888), upheld a federal manslaughter conviction of four tribal "executioners" under the Major Crimes Act. The four
defendants had carried out their council's decree of death for the tribal doctor who
was suspected of having poisoned his last twenty patients. The court relied only on
the jurisdiction of the Major Crimes Act and did not discuss the fact that the execution had been authorized by a supposedly sovereign tribal council. Nor did it discuss
the defendants' fate had the tribal doctor been sentenced instead to life imprisonment.
Some people do not believe that the Major Crimes Act precludes a tribe from dealing
with such minor offenses as petty larceny between members. E.g., Cohen, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 363. Would the defense of double jeopardy be allowed in a federal court
prosecution following a trial in an Indian court for one of the major crimes? If the
concept of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832) (the tribe is a semisovereign entity), is adhered to, the defense would not seem to be available under
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). But United States v. LaPlant, 156 F. Supp.
660 (D. Mont. 1957), held valid both a statutory defense and the defense of double
jeopardy in the case of simple assault (which is not a major crime). Cf. United States
v. Jacobs, 113 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Wis. 1953) (dictum) (tribal court conviction for
adultery will not prevent subsequent conviction for statutory rape based on the same
acts).
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ceiving of stolen goods, kidnapping, forgery, and the criminal
attempt to commit each of the substantive offenses listed in the
Major Crimes Act. Whether a tribal court may prosecute a nonIndian for an offense committed in Indian country is not entirely
clear, although in practice Indian leaders have been reluctant to
prosecute non-Indians." Civil jurisdiction of Indian courts extends
to all actions involving Indian defendants but probably does not
extend to suits by Indians against non-Indians. 2 Federal and state
cases have given universal validity to decisions of tribal courts
wherever the decisions were properly within the tribal courts'
3
jurisdiction.'
The United States Supreme Court has faced only once the
question of what constitutional limits apply to the actions of a
tribal government. The 1896 decision of Talton v. Mayes 4 involved a claim by an Indian defendant that he had been convicted
of a felony by a Cherokee tribunal without a formal indictment by
grand jury as required by the fifth amendment. The Court dis11. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (No. 7728), (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (dicta). A
Cherokee court may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian. The usual
remedy against non-Indian violators of tribal ordinances is permanent exclusion from
the reservation. See, e.g., 17 Navajo Tribal Code §§ 1072, 1782 (1962).
A few tribes have exercised jurisdiction over "visiting Indians" found on the
reservation under express departmental authority. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 9, at 148.
12. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; Mehlin v. Ice, 56 Fed. 12 (8th Cir.
1893) (upheld a writ of ejectment granted to an Indian against a non-Indian; the
court referred to the original treaty giving the highly civilized Cherokees exclusive
jurisdiction over causes of action arising on their lands, and held to the dubious
proposition that the defendant had waived his jurisdictional defenses by going to
trial on the merits. Rich v. Maybee, 2 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1933) (peace courts
created by tribal council have jurisdiction over civil actions between Indians).
13. Cases have upheld various types of tribal regulation: Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957) (tribal membership); Arenas v. United
States, 197 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1952) (adoption) ; Marris v. Sockey, 170 F.2d 599 (10th
Cir. 1948) (marriage); United States v. Charles, 23 F. Supp. 346 (W.D.N.Y. 1938)
(descent distribution) Waldron v. United States, 143 Fed. 413 (C.C.D.S.D. 1905)
(tribal membership) ; Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P. 2d 1012 (1959)
(divorce); Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 76 Mich. 498, 43 N.W. 602 (1889) (polygamy) ; Patterson v. Council of Seneca Nation, 245 N.Y. 433, 157 N.E. 734 (1927)
(tribal membership). Mr. Cohen states that Indian marriages are universally valid;
the validity of an Indian divorce, while upheld under federal law, will be determined
in a state court by the law of the state. Cohen. op. cit. supra note 9, at 139. The full
faith and credit clause has been cited as support for upholding a decision rendered
by a tribal court. Mehlin v. Ice, supra note 12; accord, Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed.
836 (8th Cir. 1894). It has not yet been argued that if an Indian tribe can be considered a "state" for purposes of the full faith and credit clause, it might also be
treated as a "state" for purposes of applying to it the governmental restrictions of the
fourteenth amendment.
14. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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missed the appeal, reasoning that because the requirement of a
grand jury did not apply to the courts of the states, it similarly
did not apply to Indian courts. Lower court decisions in the past
twenty years have extended this rationale even further. 5 A 1965
federal court of appeals ruling in Colliflower v. Garland,6 however, turned sharply from the body of historic Indian law by permitting a district court to hear a constitutional claim made by a
woman convicted in her tribal court.
The Colliflower decision raises an interesting question for examination: to what extent are the restrictions which the Bill of
Rights places upon actions of state and federal governments to be
properly applied to actions of Indian tribal governments? This
Article raises and questions some assumptions which have long prevailed in the field of federal Indian law. The nature of limitations
which are imposed upon tribes under existing law are then explored
and the Article is concluded with a discussion of particular civil
liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the merits of their
application to tribunal situations.

SOME ASSUMPTIONS QUESTIONED

The dramatic survival of the doctrine of tribal independence for
nearly a century and a half is a strange judicial comment on the
nature of the Indian within American culture. One explanation for
the survival is the sort of rationale underlying recent decisions of
the Supreme Court to the effect that courts must insure fair treatment to an Indian who remains economically inferior to the Americans around him.' 7 A second explanation may be that twentieth
15. Oliver v. Udall, 306 P.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Native Am. Church v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); Martinez v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d
89 (8th Cir. 1956); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963);
Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
16. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). See notes 43-51 and
accompanying text infra.
17. Several recent decisions shed light on the Bill of Rights issue by pointing to
considerations present in the general area of Indian law. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959), was an action by a trading post merchant operating on the Navajo reservation, who sued in a state court to collect a debt against a Navajo Indian for goods
sold on the reservation. The Supreme Court reversed:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.
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century courts have been applying nineteenth century principles to
the treatment of Indian affairs, even though such principles may be
inappropriate to present facts. Several of these principles and their
utility in dealing with modern Indian affairs are discussed below.
A.

Desirability of Assimilation
That Indian groups have determinedly maintained many of their
native associations and customs after 300 years of exposure to
European influence, presents a curious phenomenon to even the
casual onlooker. In a national culture where the Myth of the
Melting Pot is solemn to every American schoolboy, the Indian
somehow has forgotten to melt. In an age when the social and economic integration of racial minorities has become a continuing
national issue, the integration of the American Indian has gone
relatively undiscussed. The Indian takes a different perspective on
American life than the member of other minority groups. Unlike
the Negro, the Indian does not have an ancestry of slavery. Unlike
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation
and the transaction with an Indian took place there.
358 U.S. at 223. The basis of this decision is rather far removed from the abstract
legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty. Allowing the State of Arizona to have jurisdiction over the case would not have impinged seriously on the tribe's internal government; it was not alleged that either Navajo law or policy was infringed by the state
court decision. Indeed, there is authority holding that if a tribe once permits an outside enterprise to establish itself on the reservation, it must accept some of the concomitants of the enterprise as well. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1961). The heart of the decision in Williams seems to be that the economic naiveti
of an Indian defendant would receive less favorable consideration in a state court
than it would be in a trial court.
This judicial sensitivity to the economic inferiority of the American Indian appears
again in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
The State of Arizona attempted to levy a tax of two per cent on the gross income of
a merchant doing retail business on the Navajo reservation under a license from the
Indian Commissioner. The merchant protested the tax and appealed to the Supreme
Court. Such a tax is invalid, ruled the Court, because it might effectively "put financial burdens on appellant or the Indians with whom it deals in addition to those
Congress or the tribe have prescribed, and could thereby disturb and disarrange
the statutory plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians against prices deemed
unfair or unreasonable by the Indian Commissioner." 380 U.S. at 691.
See also Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), holding invalid a capital gains
tax on the sale of timber grown on an Indian's allotted land which, under the statute,
was to be "free of encumbrance."
Recent comment on Indian tribal sovereignty includes a thorough case analysis
by Kane, Jurisdiction Over Indians and Indian Reservations, 6 Ariz. L. Rev. 237
(1965) ; see also Note, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 654 (1966) ; Recent Cases, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
436 (1965).
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the Irish, Jewish, or Chinese immigrant, the Indian has never sailed
for a new land in an optimistic search for a better way of life.
Indians are different. It is true that tribal leaders today are eager
to see their people approach the same level of material well-being
and economic independence enjoyed by other Americans; they even
anticipate the time when an individual Indian choosing to relocate
outside the reservation might do so free of difficult adjustment
problems. At the same time, however, they are apt to see the term
"assimilation" as something of a "dirty word"; a large majority
of tribal authorities seem unwilling to risk the deterioration of
their people's historic identity which absorption into American
life would bring.'
Nearly every tribal group has seen part of its membership migrate to distant cities. There is evidence that such "drainoffs" have
been occurring for several generations while a conservative "reservoir" in each generation chooses to remain in the tribal homelands. 9 Today, relocation occurs chiefly among the well-educated
Indians who find the reservations lacking in economic opportunities.20
An Indian who relocates tends to sense his own "Indianess"
acutely in his language, physical traits, and customs. He experiences
a clash between his traditional virtues of sharing, group unity, and
unhurried living, with Western norms of competitiveness and
freedom. Social enclaves of Indians within the host city are an
inevitable result.2 ' Also inevitable is the return by some to their
18. Hearings on S. 961-68 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also La Farge,
Assimilation-The Indian View, New Mexico Quarterly, Spring, 1956, p. 5; Kelly,
The Economic Basis of Indian Life, 311 Annals, 71, 72 (1957), concludes that Indians
wish to continue their present status not only because of special services they may
receive, but also for the independence and security of reservation community life);
c.f. Provinse, The American Indian in Transition, 56 American Anthropologist 387
(1954) (concludes that some reservations will remain indefinitely as cultural islands
making only a superficial adjustment to American life depending upon such factors
as local prejudices, group resistance, and federal administrative practices).
19. Vogt, The Acculturation of American Indians, 311 Annals 137, 138-43 (1957).
See also Dozier, Simpson & Yinger, The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent,
311 Annals 158, 160-61 (1957).
20. Martin, Correlates of Adjustment Among American Indians in an Urban
Environment, 23 Human Organizations 290 (1964). See also Navajo Times, July 1,
1965, p. 4 (educated Indians face frustration and alcoholism on reservation).
21. Ablon, Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area, 23 Human
Organizations 296 (1964). Martin, supra note 20, at 292.
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reservations because of the above factors plus a lingering homesickness. Returns were estimated at one time to run between thirty
and sixty per cent.2 2 The effects of relocation upon second generation Indians have not been studied; the effects of a current federal
program to attract industry and employment to the reservations
23
also remains to be studied.
Cultural problems pose legal ones. Is it possible to allow the
Indian to adapt to our culture without forcing him to assimilate
into it completely? If possible, is it feasible to give the Indian a
special legal status and still provide him with an opportunity to
adapt and assimilate if he should so choose?
Older cases are replete with passages contemplating the Indian's
ultimate absorption into American life. A recent dissent by Mr.
Justice Black, however, is remarkable because it presents the first
judicial cognizance that the separate status held by tribes may be
something more than transitional. 2' The possibility that federal
authorities may someday adopt this view leads to the main theme
of this Article: that tension between tribal and Western culture
will pose an increasingly difficult challenge to federal Indian law.
22. Harmer, Uprooting the Indians, Atlantic, March 1956, p. 54. Probably the
percentage of returnees has decreased in more recent years; the Bureau of Indian
Affairs plans to help 4,000 Indians resettle in 1966. 1966 Interior Hearings, supra
note 4, at 638.
23. 1966 Interior Hearings, supra note 4, at 654.
24. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 124, (1960) (dissent of Black,
J.) The majority opinion upheld the right of the FPC to confiscate part of the Tuscarora homelands, located outside any reservation, where the language of the authorizing statute had said only that such lands "within a reservation" were exempt from
condemnation.
These Indians have a way of life which this Government has seen fit to
protect, if not actually to encourage. Cogent arguments can be made that
it would be better for all concerned if the Indians were to abandon their
old customs and habits, and become incorporated in the communities where
they reside. The fact remains, however, that they have not done this and
they have continued their tribal life with a trust in a promise of security
from this government ...
It may be hard for us to understand why these Indians cling so tenaciously to their lands and traditional tribal way of life. The record does not leave
the impression that the lands of their reservation are the most fertile, the
landscape the most beautiful, or their homes the most splendid specimen of
architecture. But this is their home-their ancestral home. ...
I regret that this Court is to be the governmental agency that breaks faith
with this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their
word.
Id. at 141-42. For the older judicial view see Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286,
315 (1911) ; United States v. Clapox, 35 Fed. 575, 577 (D. Ore. 1888).
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That law must be fashioned, on the one hand, to protect the individual Indian from injustice done under color of tribal authority;
federal law, on the other hand, must not undercut a tribe's efforts
to maintain the distinctive patterns of its own historic culture.
B.

Congressional Termination of Autonomy
The "Congress first" concept apparently originated in the older
cases which questioned whether or not the Indian was to be accorded the rights of citizenship; seeing the question basically as
a political one, the courts did not attempt to resolve it. 25 The doctrine gained in stature; in 1959, the Supreme Court invoked it in
Williams v. Lee while deciding affirmatively the essentially nonpolitical question of whether or not a non-Indian could sue an
Indian in a state court.2 6 Perhaps the doctrine is used more as
authority to support a particular decision rather than to reflect a
firm belief that a court is less competent than a legislature to inquire
into questions of this nature. It generally goes unmentioned that
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty was a judicial and not a legislative creation. A court that overcomes its reluctance to break new
ground, however, might enable itself to rectify some of the past
misapplications of the two judicial concepts discussed below.
C.

Tribal Sovereignty and GeneralLaw
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty has proved to be a doubleedged sword; state laws have seldom been applied to reservations
and federal laws have not fared much better.2 7 Sympathy toward
25. United States v. Rickett, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903).
26. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) ; See also United States v. Hellard,
322 U.S. 363 (1944); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) ; Tiger v.
Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
565 (1903).
27. Many cases have held various regulations to be invalid when applied to
reservation Indians: Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S.
685 (1965) (state tax on white trader) ; Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369
U.S. 45 (1962) (state anti-fish trap laws) ; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956)
(federal tax on proceeds from Indian allotment) ; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681
(1942) (state license for use of fish net not required from an Indian who was guaranteed by treaty the right to fish "at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with the citizens)"; Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 643 (D. Oregon, 1956) (state hunting and trapping laws) ; Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of
Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961) (local sales tax levied pursuant to congressional act allowing such tax in certain federal areas). Cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169
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state and federal law, therefore, might influence a judge to preclude
a tribe from regulating its internal affairs. 2 " The type of thinking
which underlies past decisions will hopefully give way to accommodations between the laws of a state and the self-government of a
tribe, especially if the courts once come to view the reservation
phenomenon as a more or less permanent institution for many Indians. A state court, for example, may have a legitimate interest in
allowing service of process on a non-Indian within a reservation29
whereas there may be good reasons why a state law of estate distribution should not supercede a tribal custom governing inheritance.
Perhaps in time the present rule will be replaced by one which allows
a consideration of the reasonableness of the state or federal regulation and of the amount of burden placed upon the subjects under
federal protection.
D.

Bill of Rights
Except for the recent Colliflower case, 80 the courts universally
have refused to make any inquiry into the applicability of the Constitution to tribal actions without an explicit authorization from
Congress. The problem lies in the fact that it is highly undesirable,
if not impossible, for Congress to embody in any piece of comprehensive legislation a feasible determination of what constitutional
provisions should operate on which of the tribes and under what
sets of circumstances. The more preferable approach would be a
judicial analysis of each situation on an ad hoc basis. The only
practical solution which Congress might afford would be a categorical imposition of the entire Constitution upon all tribes." That
U.S. 264 (1897) (cattle grazing); Utah & No. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)
(railroad right-of-way). The last two cases upheld a federal tax on non-Indians
whose business was located partly on reservation land. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288
F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (federal labor law applicable to factory located on Navajo
reservation). Furthermore, Warren Trading Post, supra, states that "Congress, in the
exercise of its power granted in Art. I, Sec. 8, has undertaken to regulate reservation
trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the states to legislate
on the subject." 380 U.S. at 691.
28. See Note, 51 U. Va. L. Rev. 121 (1965).
29. One state court has raised the question (without deciding it) whether process
could be served properly within a reservation upon a non-tribal Indian who resides
outside any reservation. Batchelor v. Charley, 74 N.M. 717, 398 P.2d 49 (1965).
30. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
31. Two resolutions currently under study by the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary propose to do just that. "Any Indian
tribe in exercising its powers of local self-government shall be subject to the same
limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on the Government of the
United States by the United States Constitution." S. 961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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such a harsh remedy might prove to be even less desirable than
current Indian law with its existing ills, and whether these ills
might be cured by less than a legislative remedy, is the subject of
the remainder of this Article.
II
RESTRICTIONS UPON TRIBAL ACTIONS UNDER EXISTING LAW
A variety of efforts have been employed by individual Indians
during the past twenty years in hopes of gaining federal court
relief from actions taken by their tribes. With the exception of the
1965 Colliflower ruling, 2 the Indian complainant in every case
failed to get to trial on the merits.
By far the most frequent conflicts between the Indian and his
tribe have occurred in the area of religious beliefs. The first appearance of a religious conflict occurred in the pueblo of Zia, New
Mexico. Zia, like all Southwestern pueblos, has governed itself
since time immemorial by a semi-theocracy resulting from a successful amalgamation of native mythology with the eighteenth century
teaching of Spanish Franciscans. When a Protestant Pentecostal
sect developed in the pueblo in 1947, the pueblo took sanctions
against the dissenters for their failure to perform required community services of a religious nature. One of the dissenters filed
suit in federal court. The pueblo defended on the ground that because the plaintiff had previously earned his living as a laborer, he
had failed to assert any economic injury. The court sensed the
presence of a religious issue, but dismissed the suit because the
plaintiff had failed to prove that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional requirement of 3,000 dollars.8 3
Several years ago, a situation similar to that at Zia arose at
the pueblo of Jemez, New Mexico, where tribal authorities levied
economic sanctions against a group of Protestant dissenters. The
dissenters sought to avoid the procedural defect of the Zia case
S. 962, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) provides the right of appeal and trial de novo in
federal district court "in any criminal action hereafter commenced in an Indian court
against any individual wherein an individual is convicted by the court and deprived
of a constitutional right . . . ." The draft proposal does not allow variations in trial
procedure historically accorded under the Constitution to state courts, nor does it
explicitly make the tribe an arm of the federal government so as to preclude the
possibility of double jeopardy under the Bartkus rationale. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959).
32. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
33. Herrera v. Pina, Civil No. 1297, D.N.M. 1948, described in White, The Pueblo
of Zia, New Mexico 74 (1962).
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by suing the pueblo under the federal Civil Rights Act for the
deprivation of their constitutional rights under color of state law.3 ,
The Federal District Court ruled that the activities of a pueblo
are not performed under any color of state law, citing in its support
the well-defined doctrine that a state has no power over Indian
affairs without an authorization from Congress, as well as an express clause in the New Mexico Constitution disclaiming any authority over tribal functions.3 5 The suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction from which no appeal was taken.
The issue of religious freedom appeared twice again in what
are popularly known as the Navajo Peyote Cases." In the case of
Native .4m. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, several Navajo
tribesmen sought an injunction on behalf of their religious sect
against the enforcement of a Navajo tribal ordinance banning
the use of the peyote bean on the Navajo reservation. The plaintiffs alleged that their sect utilized the hallucinatory drug produced from the peyote bean in religious ceremonies,3 and that the
tribal ban on such use was a violation of their liberties under the
first, fourth, and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court dismissed the suit and the court of appeals
affirmed. The appelate decision was notable in that it went further
34. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954). 28 U.S.C.
§1343(3) (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
35. N.M. Const. art. 21, § 2. No court has tried to delineate when, if ever, a tribe
comes "under color of state law" giving the federal district court jurisdiction short
of complete federal termination of tribal status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
36. Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Native Am. Church v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
37. The peyote cactus grows in the Rio Grande valley. It bears a small bean-like
top which contains an intoxicating alkaloid. The drug causes minor nauseous side
effects but does not appear to be dangerously habit-forming. Huxley, Brave New
World Revisited 71 (1964); La Barre, The Peyote Cult 140-50 (1950). Its consumption creates an initial feeling of exhilaration followed by several hours of perceptive
distortions and sensory illusions. Participating Indians regard this as a religious
experience and share it together in sacramental ceremonies held about four times per
year. The cult has ancient origins but has existed since the nineteenth century as an
association of individual Indians independent of tribal affiliation. La Barre, op. cit.
supra at 109-23. An average of eighty peyote offenses occurred annually on the Navajo
reservation between 1950 and 1960. Young, The Navajo Yearbook 278 (1961).
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than the lower court decision in Jemez. '8 Although the appellate
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, it did not rely on
the grounds stated in the lower court ruling. 9 Instead, it upheld
the dismissal by holding that the constitutional restrictions asserted
by the plaintiffs apply only to instrumentalities of the states or of
Congress, of which the Indian tribe is neither.
In 1962, eight Navajos living on the reservation brought an
action against the Secretary of the Interior in the District of
Columbia court seeking a declaratory judgment against the Navajo
ordinance banning peyote.4 Although the plaintiffs avoided the
jurisdictional defense, the court held that the provisions of the
first amendment do not apply to the actions of the Navajo tribe.
Furthermore, the court stated that the action of the Secretary in
approving the tribal ordinance presented no basis for a suit against
him; he "had simply recognized the valid governing authority of
the tribal council." 4 Because the Secretary had not actually threatended the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion, no justiciable contro42
versy existed.
The jurisdictional defense upheld in the preceding cases was
sharply modified by the Ninth Circuit Court in the 1965 case of
Colliflower v. Garland.4 3 An Indian woman of the Fort Belknap
Reservation, Montana, sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal
38. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
39. The appellate ruling might have rested on the district court's findings that it
had no jurisdiction for any of three reasons: (1) improper venue; (2) misjoinder of
parties defendant, or (3) tribal immunity from suit. Could the ordinance have been
upheld as a valid exercise of the tribe's police power? A state law prohibiting peyote
was upheld in its application to religion in State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 Pac.
1067 (1926) (dictum), but a more recent case is contra: People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). Federal narcotics law includes "peyote in its various
forms." 58 Stat. 682 (1944), 42 U.S.C. § 201(j) (1964).
40. Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41. Id. at 823. Accord, Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963)
(petitioner, convicted by tribal court, alleged denial of right to counsel and right of
appeal) ; Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (loth Cir. 1957) (woman of
one-half Indian blood disenrolled from tribe peremptorily).
42. The court viewed the main case in the light of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961). The Tenth Circuit held that the first amendment was inapplicable to the
tribe because it was not an arm of the federal government; the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the first amendment was inapplicable to the Secretary because he
was not directly involved in the case; this would leave open the narrow argument,
not pressed in the Tenth Circuit, that the first amendment may still be applicable
against the tribe as an instrument of the federal government if the Secretary has prescribed or approved the ordinance in question. Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 18,
at 95.
43. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
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district court from a tribal court sentence of a twenty-five dollar
fine or five days' confinement for the illegal grazing of stock. She
alleged that the tribal court had denied her a trial, the right to
counsel, and the opportunity to confront any witness against her.
The district court held itself without jurisdiction to grant the writ.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, citing a federal statute which
provides that a writ of habeas corpus will lie on behalf of anyone
who is "in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States," or "in violation of the Constitution of the United
'44
States."
The Colli/lower decision, at the least, makes it clear that future
proceedings in the Fort Belknap courts will not be immune from
judicial scrutiny. Perhaps this fact alone will significantly affect the
future conduct of the tribal court. At the same time, the decision
raises questions about how it may be applied in other situations.
First, the remedy of habeas corpus afforded by Colliflower is normally available only to persons in custody or on parole.4 5 Habeas
corpus will not lie for an Indian wishing to challenge arbitrary
action by tribal officials which does not involve criminal activity.
Moreover, the Colli/lower rationale treats the tribal courts as a
unique institution shared by both federal and tribal governments.
To hold the presumably sovereign tribe itself to be an arm of the
federal government would require somewhat different reasoning.
Until this premise is established, a tribal Indian cannot seek
injunctive relief in federal court against the appropriate tribal
48
authorities.
Second, the Colliflower decision appears to distinguish the "federal arms" of Fort Belknap tribal courts from tribal courts elsewhere. The opinion does not spell out the standards upon which
the distinction is based. Perhaps the distinction was drawn more
out of judicial courtesy to the rationale of earlier rulings than out
of a factual judgment. The opinion, however, stresses that the
Fort Belknap courts originally were creations of the federal executive, that the Fort Belknap law and order code was copied almost
verbatim from the regulations drafted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and that the United States annually helps to pay the sal44. 28 U.S.C.§2241(c)

(1),

(3) (1964).

45. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), construing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948).
46. Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964). This case states the wellsettled rule that a suit against a county or state official by a private citizen to enjoin
the violation of his constitutional rights is not an infringement of state sovereignty
forbidden by the eleventh amendment. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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aries of reservation police and judges. 4 7 The opinion does not
discuss the fact that nearly all tribal courts and councils, in their
present forms, are essentially federal creations, 4 and that the
Bureau regulations have served as a prototype for every existing
tribal code, which has been either prescribed or approved by the
Secretary of Interior. 49 Furthermore, federal funds which are used
in support of tribal law enforcement tend to be most extensive
among those Indian groups which are the least advanced economically and who are likely to be the least familiar with constitutional
processes.50 Considered in this light, the concept of federal supervision does not appear to be a helpful criterion in determining
when a tribal court conviction should be scrutinized by a federal
court.
Finally, the Colliflower opinion cautiously does not intimate
what constitutional restrictions, if any, must apply to the Fort
Belknap tribal courts. The opinion distinguishes between tribal
courts as federal instruments for purposes of jurisdiction and the
same for purposes of constitutionality. If a court is willing to
accept jurisdiction to inquire into the propriety of a tribal court
conviction but does not accept the distinction drawn in Colliflower,
the court would then seem compelled to apply all relevant constitutional provisions to the tribal court proceeding as they would
apply to a federal court proceeding. Such a result would forbid an
Indian court from practicing even those variations in tribal procedure which state courts are constitutionally permitted to exer.
cise. 5'
Individual Indians have used a variety of means, illustrated in
the cases above, in seeking a federal court review of an action done
pursuant to tribal authority. They have sued the tribe directly as
an institution existing under color of state law; they have sued
tribal leaders as well as the Secretary of Interior, and have instituted habeas corpus proceedings, of which only the latter have been
successful to date in securing federal court jurisdiction. The following grounds for federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal cases have
never been squarely decided by a federal court.
47. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 372-74 (9th Cir. 1965).
48. 48 Stat. 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. §476 (1964) ; the Navajo Tribal Council was
foreign to Navajo custom when it was created.
49. 25 C.F.R.§11.1(b)-(e) (1961).
50. 1966 Interior Hearings, jupra note 4, at 638-56. The dependence of the Fort
Belknap reserve on federal facilities is examined in Note, 26 Mont. L. Rev. 235 (1965).
51. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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4.

Tribal Incorporation Under FederalLaw.
Originally, any suit by or against a corporation chartered under
an act of Congress presented a suit arising under the laws of the
United States and the federal courts had jurisdiction." In 1925
Congress abolished federal incorporation as a basis for federal
jurisdiction unless the United States owned more than one-half of
the capital stock.53 The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has
construed the act of tribal incorporation as a consent on the part
of the tribe to be rendered subject to suit. In Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe,54 the petitioner alleged that she had wrongfully been
disenrolled from tribal membership, and that her claim was dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of Colorado upheld state jurisdiction to hear the case, reasoning that as long as the tribe had recourse to the state courts for
the protection of its own rights, it must answer to the claim of
others as well. This result was reached notwithstanding explicit
language in the articles of incoporation which withheld the tribe's
55
consent to be sued.
B.

Treaties
Occasionally, a provision in an Indian treaty has been cited to
confer an additional degree of jurisdiction on a tribal court. 6 Conversely, courts generally have chosen to overlook provisions in
treaties which tend to restrict the customary powers of tribes or
52. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213 (1928) ; Bankers
Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 U.S. 295 (1916).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
54. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). This
case was subsequent to those cited in note 12 supra.
55. The articles of incorporation, Art. II, § 1 (h), delimited the tribe's powers "to
sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the United States; but the
grant or exercise of such power to sue and be sued shall not be deemed a consent
by the said Tribe or by the United States . . . ." Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe,
150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691, 963 (1962). While the opinion did not discuss it as such,
this is the first case to abnegate squarely the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, because
tribes had exercised the right to sue without being subject to suit since early times.
The court narrows its holding considerably by reasoning that because neither the
tribal nor federal court took jurisdiction of this particular case, to deprive plaintiff
of any remedy whatsoever would deny her the equal protection of the laws under
the fourteenth amendment. Ibid.
56. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) ; In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107 (1891)
Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (No. 7720) (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (dicta). These
cases refer to the Hopewell Treaty of 1835 allowing Cherokee courts to exercise ex,'lusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal actions involving only member Indians.
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tribal courts.5 7 Language of treaties can hardly be considered a
viable limitation on tribal actions today; Congress terminated its
treaty-making with Indians in 1871, and few treaties made prior to
that date contain express provisions limiting tribal actions.58 The
plaintiff in the Jernez 9 case cited the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
between the United States and Mexico which provided that all
Indians within the area being ceded to the United States by Mexico
"will hereafter be under the exclusive control of the government of
the United States ....
-60 The plaintiff evidently had argued that
the treaty language served to divest all tribes in the territory of
their previously autonomous status. While this argument was not
passed upon, it does present an interesting question: is the term
"exclusive" in the treaty a delineation of jurisdiction as between
the United States and Mexico or a delineation of jurisdiction internally within the United States? Under the latter interpretation,
subsequent acts of Congress have effectively nullified that clause
in the treaty. This conceivably might give a claim for damages to
Mexico against the United States government for its violation of
the treaty, but it would not provide an enforceable right to have
exclusive jurisdiction over affairs of Southwestern Indians conferred in the federal courts. 6 '
C.

FederalCivil Rights Acts
The Colliflower case 62 illustrates how the federal habeas corpus
statute can be expanded to provide federal jurisdiction in Indian
criminal cases. Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 might be
interpreted to create federal jurisdiction over certain Indian civil
suits. Such jurisdiction is arguable under a provision in the act providing for liability of private individuals not acting under color of
state authority where they have conspired "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws ...
."" The Civil Rights Act
57. Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897) ; Talton v. Mayes, supra note 56; Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196 (1894).
58. 16 Stat. 566 (1871), 25 U.S.C. §71 (1964). See 2 Kappler, Indian Affairs,
Laws and Treaties 3-120 (1904).
59. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
60. 9 Stat. 930 (1848).
61. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 35 (1942), discusses the consequences of a treaty abrogation by Congress.
62. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
63. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964). The act, as a source of federal
jurisdiction over Indians, is discussed in Comment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 285, and was
rejected in Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
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of 1964 is not helpful here; it creates private liability for the denial
of equal protection only in narrow areas involving public accommodations, state facilities, and employment practices. 4
Liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 may be established
by showing a conspiracy of two or more persons in any state or
territory plus a single act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
broad statutory language might allow its application to actions of
Indians, especially of tribal leaders, although this possibility has
never been argued in court. The initial difficulty facing such an
argument is the century-old doctrine that federal laws of general
applicability are not generally applicable to Indian affairs except
where Congress has explicitly stated."' The alternative argument
rests on the theory that all national citizens, including Indians,
possess a modicum of rights to individual liberty of which no other
person may deprive them; furthermore, such rights are protected
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
If the argument for applicability is accepted, an Indian plaintiff
must still allege the violation of a right which is protected by the
statute. Since 1871, the courts have defined two general classes of
violations for which this statute provides a remedy: (1) the denial
of those rights necessary to the effective conduct of business between individuals and agencies of the federal government, for
example, the right to petition Congress for the redress of grievances; 6 and (2) the denial of equal protection of the laws. This
latter violation contemplates a discrimination by private individuals
against another individual or by one class against another. Liability
in this statute does not rest on discrimination done under color of
state authority; essential to a cause of action is the allegation that
private persons somehow have manipulated the law or interfered
with legal processes so that the party bringing the action was denied
67
equal justice.
64. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a), (e) (1964).
65. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) ; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883). The argument for applicability may be weakened by the fact that Congress'
avowed purpose in passing the act was the protection of newly emancipated Negroes
from discrimination at the hands of Southern reconstruction authorities, although the
scope of the remedies provided has been widened considerably in recent decisions.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
66. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945). The right to travel on a federal highway interstate is a federal right
protected under the act. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
67. The equal protection clause protects individuals against state action but not
against wrongful action by other individuals. United States v. Guest, supra note 66,
at 755.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1871, on its face, is a feasible source of
redress to the Indian. The act could not apply to a case where equal
protection has been denied by a single tribal authority, because an
allegation of conspiracy is necessary. Moreover, the act is inapplicable to a situation where due process has been denied, unless the
denial is shown to have been discriminatory or done under color of
state law.68 The statute, for example, might provide liability where
a ruling clique passes a bill of attainder concerning a critic. It
might not provide liability where such a bill is passed pursuant to
a valid tribal ordinance providing for sanctions against all critics
of the tribal council.
D.

Due Process and the Tribe
The opinion in the Colliflower69 case illustrates the desirability
that federal courts have some basis for reviewing the proceedings
in tribal courts. At the same time, equating a tribal court with a
federal agency raises some undesirable implications. Furthermore,
the Collilower rationale extends only to judicial proceedings; an
Indian still may be subjected to unfair discrimination by tribal
leaders for which the Civil Rights Act of 1871 can provide only
partial relief. A method of resolution which the courts are barely
beginning to explore is the concept of treating the tribe as a state
or territory for purposes of applying the due process clause. Two
recent lower federal court decisions explicitly rejected the tribalstate equation.70 Older Supreme Court opinions, however, were
willing to consider the government of an Indian tribe as analogous
to the government of a territory. 7' By utilizing the analogy, the
68.

17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

69. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). For the implication of
this decision see notes 43-51 and accompanying text supra.
• 70. "Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that
of states.
They are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers as such only to
to the extent that they have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior
sovereign, the United States." Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959). Barta v. Oglala Sioux, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), rejected the tribe-state analogy where it was raised by a non-Indian protesting a tribal
tax on leases of reservation land to non-Indians.
71. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (dicta) ; Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 100 (1855). These cases treated the Cherokee nation as a territory for
purposes of a statute permitting the duly authorized executor of an estate "in any
of the United States or the territories thereof" to prosecute claims in the District of
Columbia. Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836 (8th Cir. 1894) ; and Mehlin v. Ice, 56
Fed. 12 (8th Cir. 1893), extended full faith and credit to judgments of Cherokee
courts under a federal treaty granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Cherokee over
causes of action arising within Indian country where member Indians were the only
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courts would have a viable method for checking the exercise of
arbitrary power within a tribal structure, and yet the rules, customs,
or procedures of a given Indian group would not be exposed automatically to the constitutional limitations to which the federal government is subjected. The very notion of due process suggests an
inquiry into the social needs which underlie a particular government
action as well as the unfairness to individuals which may result.
III
DUE PROCESS AND THE INDIANS

Due process sets minimum requirements for any controversy
under adjudication-notice and hearing, opportunity to present
evidence, and proper jurisdiction of the court. Beyond that, the
question of making Indian tribes subject to the fourteenth amendment is: must the doctrine of incorporation be applied completely,
making the tribes automatically subject to standards which the
Supreme Court has set for the states? Or can Indians be treated
as something sui generis where the federal courts may fashion a
doctrine of "Indian incorporation" in its own right? Optimally,
courts will choose to do the latter, thereby utilizing the flexibility
inherent in the very concept of due process. 72 Building a compen-

dium of constitutional Indian law with this formula can become an
eclectic process by borrowing from the rationales of analogous
federal cases and earlier Indian cases, in addition to the determination of fair standards in each new situation.
parties. 14 Stat. 799 (1866). The Supreme Court has affirmed convictions of territorial
courts where rights denied to defendants were held to be methods of trial procedure
rather than guarantees of fairness. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (verdict
returned by a three-judge Philippine court) ; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)
(indictment presented by judge; verdict returned by a three-fourths majority of the
jury).
72. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the
limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for
certainty but ignores the movements of a free society. It belittles the scale
of the conception of due process. The real clue to the problem confronting the
judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where
the line is once and for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the
Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion.'
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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A1.

Tribal Court Procedure
Federal court review of proceedings in Indian trials must squarely face the balancing of two interests: (1) that an Indian citizen
obtain in his forum the same degree of fair treatment which is
afforded to a non-Indian in his, and (2) that a deviation from
conventional standards by an Indian tribunal not be condemned
for the sole reason that it is different. De Tocqueville's warning is
appropriate in this regard lest one too easily "confuse familiarity
with necessity. ' 73 Separate questions of due process in the context
of Indian court proceedings are discussed below.
1. A Hearing on the Merits
The Supreme Court has made it clear that when an agency or a
court of a state undertakes to determine the rights of parties
within its jurisdiction, due process requires that at some point the
litigant be afforded a chance to present his case fully. 74 If the same
requirement is to apply to Indian tribunals, the problem becomes
complicated when a tribal controversy is determined by the governing council instead of the court. This has happened not only in
conflicts between a member and his tribe but also in civil contro75
versies between two Indian parties.
The case is conceivable where the tribal council has heard the
evidence in a particular controversy, but the court does not have
written records available to review what was said in council meeting.7" Indian legislatures tend to be highly representative forms of
government similar to the New England town meeting or the
Athenian Ecclesia." The Indian judge in such a case might have
difficulty providing an adequate review, partly because of judicial
restraint, and partly because of a fear that a hearing de novo
73.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)

(concurring opinion of Frankfurter,

J.).
74. Willner v. Comm. on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1963) ; Railroad Comm'n
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1938).
75. White, op. cit. supra note 33, at 220; Smith, New Mexico Indians Today 81
(1965).

76. Hearings on S. 961-68 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1965). A tape recording of council proceedings would provide a partial solution; some councils, of
course, may prefer to do without such records.
77. See White, op. cit. supra note 33, at 221, which describes Southwestern pueblos
where all adult males are generally members of council. Not all members are able
to attend council in certain pueblos due to the small size of council buildings.
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might be less adequate than the earlier hearing in council. The
court then would be left to reconstruct the discussion through testimony of the parties and of council members and possibly through
the personal recollections of the judge himself. A federal court
called upon to review the case might want to ask whether the appellant had been given the opportunity to present his evidence fully
and to challenge the evidence, witnesses, and arguments marshalled
against him. Its problem comes in choosing a method for answering these questions. Will it rely heavily on findings made in tribal
court, and if it does, is this fair to the appellant? Alternatively,
is it feasible for the district court to reconstruct the council meeting on its own? Or, finally, is it best to ignore entirely the proceedings in council and conduct a second (or a third) trial de novo?
2.

Right to Counsel

Tribal courts generally prohibit the appearance of professional
attorneys in their proceedings although an Indian defendant may
select, or have the court select in his behalf, a representative from
among the tribesmen.7 s Exclusion of professional counsel is justified in part because a large part of proceedings in Indian courts
still are conducted in the native tongue, 79 presenting initial obstacles
to communication between counsel and witness because there are
few Indian lawyers. Another fear is that non-Indian professional
influence would unduly formalize court procedure. 0 While a lawyer
and an Indian judge are both accustomed to playing the same game,
they are accustomed to playing it under substantially different rules.
The attorney normally is trained only in the common law method
of trial; such things as the privilege against self-incrimination, the
use of hearsay, circumstantial or character evidence, and the rules
governing interrogation of witnesses might well appear to him as
basic canons of justice. He may forget that his set of rules is only
one such set, and that a strikingly different approach to judicial
78. Hearings on S. 961-68 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961) ; 22 Fed. Reg.
10517 (1957)' (revoked May 18, 1961, as to courts of Indian offenses); 7 Navajo
Tribal Code § 386 (1962).
79. 1965 Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 76, at 213.
80. Id. at 153; 1961 Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 78, at 24, 55. One should
compare the complaints of a non-reservation Indian woman that at one very controversial tribal court session, "everybody talked out of turn." Albuquerque Journal,
June 27, 1965, p. E-6.

OcroBER 1966]

BILL OF RIGHTS AND INDIAN GOVERNMENT

inquiry is used in non-English tribunals."' The Indian judge may
assume the role of examiner served by counsel in common law
trials. A greater need may exist in Indian courts than in others
to protect against the possibility that an unsophisticated Indian
witness, who is not familiar either with basic legal terms or with
the English tongue, would be misled by educated professional
advocates.
Recent Supreme Court decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright,
Escobedo v. Illinois, and Miranda v. Arizona 82 raise new questions
about the need for counsel in Indian courts. The decisions appear
to embrace two distinct concepts under the "Right to Counsel"
label. Gideon requires the states to provide professional counsel
for indigent defendants in all trials except minor offenses; however,
the decision seems to presuppose the existence of elaborate trial
machinery with which the defendant cannot successfully cope by
himself. When confronted with a different kind of machinery in an
Indian court, one must then ask: what is the essential function of
Gideon.? To help the defendant understand the technical nature of
the proceedings? Or, in addition, to help the defendant prepare his
case as a dispassionate but sympathetic third person? If Gideon
rests only on the former theory, then perhaps an Indian counsel need
not be made available to all Indian defendants. In any event, it is
arguable that Gideon does not require common law counsel in
Indian courts.
The Escobedo and Miranda decisions require state law enforcement officers to provide counsel to an accused, upon his request
during any prolonged pre-trial interrogation. The opinions do not
rest directly on fairness in trial procedure. Indeed, Escobedo makes
truth of a confession obtained under the above circumstances irrelevant by abandoning the common law practice of admitting
coerced confessions when they are still credible. Moreover, it makes
the test of "voluntariness" inapplicable."a It remains to be seen
whether the requirements of pre-trial counsel is only a further
effort to guarantee the voluntariness of confessions, or whether it
is essentially concerned with the substantive rights of citizens in81. See, e.g., the allocation of functions between the Juge and Procureur in French
criminal courts of first instance. Keedy, The Preliminary Inveitigation of Crime in
France, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 385 (1940).
82. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. Both tests are discussed in Culombe v. Connecticut 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
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dependent of the trial process. If the former, the due process clause
might well proscribe Indian police from questioning suspects without giving proper warning of rights under Escobedo and Miranda.
Since Escobedo and Miranda have not been given retroactive application, 4 one could conclude that the basis of these opinions is
not the securing of a fair trial, but the protection of the individual
suspect against police infringement of his right against self-incrimination. If this is correct, the question is whether Indian police
within the setting of reservation justice must conform to the same
standards as those set for federal and state police elsewhere.
3. Appeals
The Supreme Court has held that a state is not constitutionally
required to provide the right of appeal from a trial court decision
although the right is provided in all fifty states.8 5 The Court has

held, however, that a state must make available its existing appellate machinery for any party wishing to use it."" Nearly every tribal
code allows for review of court decisions by the Secretary of Interior although in practice such a review is virtually nonexistent.8
Probably the greatest obstacle to an adequate Indian appellate
system is the lack of an adequate number of trained Indian judges.
Moreover, an Indian litigant may appeal from a tribal court ruling
only to discover that the trial court judge is either the sole reviewing judge or else is sitting as a member of the appellate bench.88
Whether either of these situations constitutes a denial of due process has yet to be decided.
4.

Nature of Trial

The fifth amendment requirement of an indictment by grand
jury in serious offenses and the sixth amendment guarantees of
speedy and public trial and trial by jury are not yet applicable to
84. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
85. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (dictum); Standard Oil of Indiana
v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912) (holding that a fine fixed by the state supreme
court is reviewable only for constitutional violations); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 687 (1894).
86. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 85, holding that a state's appellate procedure
must be made available to an indigent party on an equal basis with others.
87. 1961 Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 78, at 134. 1965 Hearings on S. 961-68,
supra note 76, at 157, 238.
88. 1961 Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 78, at 13.

OCTOBER 1966]

BILL OF RIGHTS AND INDIAN GOVERNMENT

state court proceedings by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment." The question remains whether an Indian court may freely
deny the jury right in some situations if it provides the right in
others. May the right be extended only to defendants and not to
plaintiffs in civil cases? Or may the right be made available in the
trial of certain designated offenses and not in others carrying
equivalent penalty provisions?"0 Suppose, furthermore, that the
Supreme Court were to consider a public trial to be a fundamental
requisite of due process. In that event would the proceeding before
a tribal court be "public" if it is restricted to member Indians? Is
the proceeding "public" if no written records have been kept?

5. Punishment of Criminal Offenses
There is some indication in recent Supreme Court decisions that
the eighth amendment guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment might operate under the due process clause as a limitation
on the sentence which a court might impose for a particular offense. 1 Indian codes are not likely to offend the eighth amendment
requirements if the severity of punishment is judged in terms of
Western punishments for corresponding offenses. Indian punishments are not cruel in the sense of inflicting bodily pain; in fact,
corporal punishment does not exist among tribes today.92 Indeed,
most Indian sentences are light. Punishments for certain kinds of
conduct may appear harsh to a non-Indian. For example, the
Navajo Tribal Code goes beyond common law scienter requirements by making illegal the very possession of liquor by "any Indian," presumably anywhere.9 3 Here the social evil underlying the
offense may be far more acute in an Indian community than in a
89. See People v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 391, 171 N.E.2d 310 (1960) (speedy trial)
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) (public trial).
90. 7 Navajo Tribal Code §441 (1962), allows jury trial in all criminal prosecutions and in all civil cases not involving domestic relations or decedent's estates.
25 C.F.R. § 11.7 (1961), provides for jury trial on any substantial question of fact,
with a panel of six jurors who may return a verdict by majority vote in the event of
disagreement.
91. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963); Trop v. United States, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) ; Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
1071 (1964).
92. Lange, Cochiti 226 (1959), states that the last corporal punishment among
Southwestern Indians occurred in 1948 when a woman was lashed for spreading
malicious gossip.
93. 17 Navajo Tribal Code § 1071 (1962).
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non-Indian one. Moreover, tribal facilities for94handling a large
number of liquor offenders may be highly limited.
The basic Indian approach to penology offers a bold contrast to
that of the United States. Felix Cohen, comparing tribal codes
with those of the states,95 explains how states employ a system of
criminal law working to deter dangerous conduct generally, where
much of the definition of right and wrong is left to individual
reason.: A tribal code may be limited to forty or fifty specified
offenses, and each member receives a copy of the code which he is
encouraged to discuss with authorities. Punishment is more humane: maximum imprisonment for a single offense is six months,
and many sentences take the form of hard labor for the benefit of
the victim or tribe. Finally, the trial court is allowed a wide discretion unburdened by written rules in affixing the punishment according to the offense, and the particular facts surrounding his act. As
one pueblo governor wrote

:96

Troubles are measured under our law not little piece by little
piece, but over the long haul as a whole. People who give trouble
are measured under our law not little act by little act, but as a
whole, over the long haul. The purpose of our courts is to make
good members of this Pueblo out of any members who get into
trouble with our courts. . . . Our officers know how to go easy
sometimes; our officers also know how to wait. This often helps
bring an offender to right ways. . . . But when a man refuses to
do his duties, that tells his intention for all the future .

B.

Substantive Law and Due Process
1.

Property Rights

The authority of an Indian tribe to regulate land within its
jurisdiction is derived in part from its power as a sovereign and
in part from its rights as a landowner. The question of how far
these dual powers may be exercised is posed in the context of current tribal efforts to develop the productivity of reservation land.
Hypothetically, a tribal council might determine that far too many
94. Young, The Navajo Yearbook 280-84 (1961), discusses aberrant behavior
and extreme alcoholism among a fraction of tribesmen and the fact that the punishment of incarceration provides a less effective deterrent to criminal behavior than in
other communities. See also Lange, op. cit. supra note 92, at 226: a tribal correctional program often must cope with inadequate jail space and the difficulty of collecting fines from offending members.
95. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 149 (1942).
96. Bunker, Other Men's Skies 239 (1956).
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Navajos are now subsisting by grazing sheep on semi-arid land,
that the eventual solution lies in a drastic reduction in the number
of shepherds and in production quotas on sheep raised, and that
much of the land now being grazed must be diverted to irrigation
or to other economic uses.9 7 If such restrictions are defended as an
exercise of sovereign power, analogous cases in the field of state
confiscation may apply. The analogous cases"8 hold that no matter
how great the need for confiscation, the state must pay just compensation once the court has found a "taking" to have occurred.
Whether or not a tribe is similarly restricted may be crucial to the
introduction of any long-range land reform due to scarcity of tribal
funds to support an ambitious land development project.
The problem of determining when a "taking" has occurred in
Indian situations is equally difficult. Must a shepherd be deprived
of his land completely? May a portion of his land be restricted to
non-grazing use, or made subject to an irrigation right of way?
And is the compensation requirement satisfied if the dispossessed
Indian is given other land of equivalent acreage? A related problem
lies in the fact that few reservation Indians actually "own" their
land, but hold a use-right either individually or in conjunction with
a community.9 9 In practice, the use-right does not differ substantially from ownership in fee simple-the holder normally uses the
land in his discretion and may inherit, devise, lease, or sell his
right.'0 0 Legal title throughout such transactions will continue to
vest either in the tribe in fee simple or in the federal government
in trust for the tribe. The equitable or legal title might be determined to give a tribe plenary power over the distribution of its
land despite the fact that use holders have treated the land as
their own for generations. The possession of plenary power in the
tribe, of course, might still be limited by the equal protection clause
to prevent the tribe from regulating the use of land in an arbitrary
or discriminatory way.
97. Shepardson, Navajo Ways in Government (Memoir No. 96, American Anthropology Association, 1963).
98. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
99. Shepardson, op. cit. supra note 97, at 33-34.
100. Occasionally the council will require its approval for the leasing of tribal
land to a non-Indian (Bunker, op. cit. supra note 96, at 235) or impose a special tax
on all such leases (Barta v. Oglala Sioux, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958)). A related
question is whether a tribe, once it becomes subject to the fourteenth amendment, may
properly make any distinctions between Indian and non-Indian landholders under the
privileges and immunities clause.
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2.

Restraint Over the Person
Individual Indians have complained on occasion of mistreatment
at the hands of both state and tribal officials. They mention police
brutality, illegal search and seizure, and prolonged detention. None
of these complaints has ever been pressed in federal court.' °1 Limitation on methods of police enforcement on a reservation remains
an open question, modified only by guarantees of the thirteenth
amendment. 2 An initial difficulty in the administration of a modern tribal law enforcement program is the lack of adequate tribal
funds to provide an effective staff of tribal policemen and judges.'0 °
An Indian may find himself detained for a prolonged period because the proper police authorities simply are not available to conduct questioning. When he is questioned, he may be forced to wait
overnight or several days before a judge can be present for a
hearing.
A second difficulty lies in the very geography of Indian offenses.
For better or worse, tribes have almost universally prohibited the
sale of liquor on reservations. 4 One apparent result of this policy
is "migratory drinking," or the custom of travelling to bars off the
reservation. This custom predictably gives rise to numerous incidents involving Indians in liquor violations and liquor-related offenses.'0 5 Whereas a non-Indian picked up by the police for disorderly conduct may be given an escort home, an Indian in the
same circumstances is likely to be far from home and may be detained summarily in the nearest municipal or tribal jail for a period
to "cool off."' a
101. 111 Cong. Rec. 1800 (1965). The plaintiffs in Native American Church v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959), alleged illegal arrest and
illegal search and seizure in their original complaint but did not pursue those claims
on appeal.

102. In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (D. Alaska 1886). The court granted a writ of
habeas corpus to one Indian

being held in bondage by another. Neither of the

Indians were "tribal." Moreover, the thirteenth amendment is not limited in application to organs of government.

103. Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency Among the Indians, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
30 (1956) ; 1961 Hearings on S. 961-68, supra note 78 (detention problems).

104. The Navajos prohibit even the possession of liquor by Indians on the reservation and the transportation of liquor by any person. 17 Navajo Tribal Code §§ 1071,
1072 (1962).
105. Riffenburg, Juvenile Delinquency Among Southwest Indians, Federal Proba-

tion, September 1964, p. 24.
106. Tbid; Faerber, Indians, Law Enforcement and Local Government (1957).
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Free Speech and Association

The ultimate question is whether a tribe must be considered as
a governmental entity for purposes of the first amendment. An
Indian tribe has traditionally exercised a large degree of control
over the personal activities of its members which might be considered quite rigid by Western standards. Criminal charges of
"spreading malicious gossip" and "witchcraft" still arise among
the more isolated tribes. 1°7 Both charges are characteristically
criminal rather than civil, because a person may bring the accusation without being a victim of the offense, and he addresses the
charge to the tribe in a council meeting rather than to the accused
in tribal court.10 8 Little is known of the charge of witchcraft and
little is heard of it today except as a means of social control outside
the scope of Indian penal law. Malicious gossip, however, remains
a viable offense. It may be justified in part by analogy to the law
of criminal libel although neither truth nor privilege are defenses. The basic evil at which the charge of malicious gossip is
aimed, however, is not the defamation of an individual so much as
the ever present possibility of divisive factionalism breaking out
between members of a close homogeneous group. Social harmony
is at stake and not simply the protection of personal property:
Pueblo law is 'natural' in that it represents the least requirement

Pueblo members feel they must exact of each other simply in order
to maintain community life. They may sometimes be short-sighted
or unduly fearful. But their exactions are nothing accidental, no
extraneous ideals super-imposed on their society. Their effort is to
find room for more than one man's idea of right and wrong within
the one community.""
How far the justification of community solidarity will extend
received a brief test in the Pueblo of Isleta, New Mexico. A dispute
broke out during the summer of 1965 between the pueblo governor
and the Catholic priest assigned to the village church. The priest
had criticized the holding of native religious ceremonies (contrary
to a customarily neutral policy of Catholic prelates in pueblos),
107. Lange, op. cit. rupra note 97, at 226; Shepardson, op. cit. supra note 92, at 95.
108. Shepardson, op. cit. supra note 97, at 70. Kluckhohn, The Navajo 244-52 (1946),
concerns witchcraft accusations as a technique of social control.
109. Bunker, op. cit. supra note 96, at 239; see also Smith, op. cit. supra note 75,
at 146.
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whereupon the governor promptly ejected the priest from the
pueblo. Although a large majority of members supported the governor's action, a small group criticized the actions in a letter to an
Albuquerque newspaper. 1 0 Upon the letter's publication, the governor arrested two of the dissident leaders on the charge of "defaming a public official." The two imprisoned Indians immediately
brought suits for habeas corpus in federal district court but were
released from custody before hearings in either tribal or federal
court."' The propriety of the governor's acts faces the initial challenge of whether the offense of "defaming a public official" actually
existed within the body of unwritten pueblo law, or whether the
governor had created the offense ad hoc in order to dispose of annoying critics. If the former, the question arises whether in this
instance the governor had applied the law discriminatorily toward
the dissident Indians. If not, a tribe may have legitimate reasons
why it chooses not to exempt a public official from relief under its
law of defamation. There may be a greater need to protect public
officials whose political position in a close community is highly intertwined with his social and possibly religious status. There is the
additional consideration that a tribe may want to minimize open
dissention.
Because of the small number of officials in the administration of
many tribes, however, an individual Indian may find it impossible
to speak on the shortcomings of his government without closely
risking defaming public officials. In this light, the offense of "defaming a public official" might be held to violate freedom of speech
because it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of
members to comment on the business of their government. The
Supreme Court has recently held that no civil action for defamation
of a public official will lie without proof of actual malice." 2 Even
so, it is questionable whether the guarantee of free speech should
extend equally to statements made in council to tribal members as
it would to statements made off the reservation to non-Indians.
Infringements made by a tribe on what a common law lawyer
might consider to be basic personal rights have been made almost
exclusively through the machinery of criminal sanctions, equally
applicable to all members of a tribe. The rare exception is the use
of direct legislative fiat controlling the particular actions of tribal
110. Albuquerque Journal, June 30, 1965, p. 1.
111. Albuquerque Journal, August 11, 1965, p. A-2.
112. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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members. The highly conservative Santo Domingo Pueblo uses
this practice even today, exercising complete control over such decisions as whether an individual will go away to college, accept employment, or marry outside the pueblo. 113 The exercise of too much
arbitrariness in this regard is checked by the unwillingness among
older Indians to drive young Indians from the reservation." 4
4.

The Religious Issue

Like the freedom of speech problem, it is arguable that tribal
religious practices must not be made subject to the first amendment.
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . ." These two distinct limitations on the
power of government are brought into sharp focus by the relationships between religious functions, governmental functions, and individual liberty in American Indian tribes and most notably among
the highly organized groups of the Southwest.
It was not until 1923 that the Supreme Court first began to suggest that "liberty" under the fourteenth amendment had reference
to freedom in religion and education as well as freedom from bodily
restraint." 5 The grounds for this incorporation were never clarified and are even hazier in terms of the establishment clause of the
first amendment because establishment lingered in some New England states until the 1830's.16 More recently, the Court has allowed
the states to accommodate sectarian interests wishing to utilize
state facilities so long as the state does not lend its "persuasive
force" to those interests and so long as those interests do not rereceive direct financial support from the state." 7
Significantly, questions of secular government among the states
have largely focused upon religious influence within the public educational system. The formal education of Indian children, however,
occurs exclusively in schools operatedby the federal or state governments and by private non-Indian groups." 8 It is in the area of
113. Smith, op. cit. supra note 75, at 253.
114. Lange, op. cit. supra note 92, at 226.
115. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116. See Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (1953).
117. Compare McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), with Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
118. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations for 1966 of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 656 (1966).
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informal education, where the Indian youth learns native custom
and mythology, that traits of establishment in tribal government
begin to appear. The issue poses itself at the outset: to what extent
must a tribal government withdraw from its traditional role as
the regulator of social and religious functions once its political
function becomes subject to the scrutiny of due process?
The role of religion in Indian affairs is perhaps best illustrated
in the Rio Grande pueblos. In each pueblo the religious hierarchy
maintains a degree of influence over community governmental
affairs; each one has successfully accommodated its native mythology and customs with teachings of the Catholic Church for over
300 years.
On the simplest level, a tribal council begins to embrace religious
attitudes when it recognizes certain beliefs and makes accommodations to it. This happens when a council insists on maintaining its
traditional tribal calendar which permits dates of religious rites to
fall during the work week, thus burdening those members of the
tribe who are employed off the reservation.' x It may permit the
use of a council building for the conduct of ceremonies, or dedicate
a kiva permanently to religious use. It is a less frequent but not
unusual occurrence for the council to organize and help to finance
the construction of the local Catholic church. 2 Religious influence
may be even more pronounced. Certain officials among the less progressive pueblos are appointed by the cacique, who is the pueblo
religious leader taking his post by inheritance.'
Perhaps more notable are the restrictions upon a member's free
exercise of religion imposed by a tribe. The Supreme Court has upheld governmental limitations upon religiously motivated conduct
in some non-Indian cases, but only where the offsetting public needs
appear to be very great, for example, the need of a sovereign to
raise an army, or the desirability of having a uniform family structure within a society. 122 Direct tribal sanctions against dissident
members have not rested on an essentially secular governmental
need which conflicts incidentally with a person's private conviction,
119. Smith, op. cit. supra note 75, at 146; cf. the religious practice in Taos Pueblo
excluding electricity and running water from the village proper. The exclusion may
be a proper right of pueblo land ownership; alternately it might be defended as a
reasonable exercise of the police power analogous to state blue laws. See McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
120. Smith, op. cit. supra note 75, at 146.
121. Ibid.
122. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
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but instead, the religious belief of the tribe and of the member meet
in direct confrontation. Perhaps, imposing the requirement of due
process on a tribe would preclude any such confrontation. The question is whether the tribal police power does not entail different considerations than the police power as a mechanism of a state or
national government. Individual freedom and creativity of mind
have come to assume fundamental importance as values which, in the
long run, promote the continued development of an educated
and mature society. To an Indian group whose mores are not
so oriented, the concept of individual dissent receives a less favorable response.
There is a second aspect of tribal religious suppression having
constitutional implications. It is one thing to speak of tribal sanctions imposed on tribal members in order to maintain the community harmony, but it is something else to withhold the right of
entry into a reservation to non-Indian groups wishing to proselytize. This would create the risk of giving a virtual monopoly to
that denomination already established within a social or geographical area and thereby exclude those mission groups too slow in arriving. Perhaps a federal court would be proscribed by the first
amendment from upholding the exclusion if the question were
before it; at the same time, a tribe may have quite a valid interest
in excluding Western proselytizers.2 3
The peyote regulations assume a somewhat different posture
because they spring in part from public health interests rather than
considerations of public morality. Yet, if 12,000 out of a total of
90,000 Navajos are estimated to be using peyote, 2 4 one questions
whether a health measure of dubious merits1 25 can prevail in the
narrow context of a religious cult where the drug ( 1 ) is an essential
part of the cult's "theology," (2) is used only in connection with
the cult's rites, and (3) enjoys such a widespread usage.
IV
LEGAL NORMS AND INDIAN PROGRESS

A person's attitudes toward Indian legal rights may be partly
founded upon some unspoken sentiments concerning the role of
123. 17 Navajo Tribal Code §1782(16) (1962), excludes missionaries from the
reservation without a permit; § 1782(9) prohibits solicitation of Indian labor on the
reservation without a permit.
124. Young, op. cit. supra note 94, at 526. In addition, the peyote regulations were
concededly a religious measure when enacted in 1940. Native Am. Church v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
125. See note 37 supra.
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Indians. An Indian tribe falls easy prey to the misleading analogy
of a voluntary association, the members of which have made a
conscious choice in favor of tribal ways. If an Indian always has
free access to the outside world, the argument goes, then he does
not appropriately invoke constitutional machinery when he chooses
to locate within a more stringent governmental system. This argument, in the first place, fails to cope adequately with those instances
of arbitrary exercise of tribal authority to which members have not
at any time voiced consent. Second, an Indian's choice to stay on a
reservation is hardly a dispassionate one if it is even "voluntary."
For an Indian to leave the reservation, he must leave behind all his
real property and some personal possessions. Moreover, he must
leave behind those personal memories, interests, associations, and
a language which make much of his life worth living. It is hard to
imagine an Indian either accepting or rejecting tribal government
in a manner which is free from compelling personal demands.
While the tribal function may not easily be upheld as the voluntary enterprise of its members, nevertheless an Indian group must
surely exist as more than a bare legal entity. All this suggests a
second consideration-the extra-legal effects which might result
from the legal power reposing in a tribe.
A certain amount of appeal still attaches to the modern Indian
as something of a museum piece. He is a living continuation of the
noble savage existing apart from the White man's world. Yet, no
one has advocated keeping the Indian in a condition which is economically and educationally inferior to that of other Americans. From
this standpoint, one can properly question the relationship between
a tribe's legal institutions and the social development of its people.
Will a permissive constitutional policy toward native legal practice
tend to retard progress in other areas? Perhaps the fewer "old
ways" that a tribesman is permitted to retain, the better. An old
Hopi who grows peach trees in an Arizona canyon might tend to
identify traditional legal ways with traditional economics. Conversely, his exposure to modern constitutional ideas might motivate him toward economic development as well. However, such a
casual relationship might not even appear to an unsophisticated
Hopi.
A connection between law and economics seems remote where
only a specific practice is involved, such as informal court hearings
or even the peyote prohibitions. There may be the more likely
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effects of economic retardation where the personnel of pueblo government are determined through native custom resulting in a rule
of the elderly. Yet, even here the will of the majority of the pueblo
appears to have the final say. As one governor wrote,
You can't make the community just the way you want it. You
got to go along with your people. Regardless of how slow they are
progressing, you have to keep along with
them, rather than be way
26
ahead and have others way out behind.1
There are offsetting considerations. Primary among them is a
fear that rapid imposition of foreign practices would risk a disintegration not only of an Indian social structure, but of Indian
personality as well. It is a fairly conclusive finding of Indian anthropologists that satisfactory development of an Indian people is not
likely to take place without a corresponding development of strong
tribal self-government resting on the confidence of community members. 127 The existence of a well-functioning tribal government
based on a set of group mores seems necessary if the Indian is to
take his place in society in some orderly form. The amount of social
disorganization among Indian groups appears to rise in proportion
to the breakdown of social order within the tribe. The effects of
disorganization are seen in crime rates and alcoholism among Indians who stay on a "broken" reservation as well as in their inability to make a successful relocation on the outside.
This sort of analysis would suggest that the end objective of
"Americanizing" the Indians is not to be accomplished by a cavalier
126. Smith, op. cit. supra note 75, at 149-50. Remaining theocratic ties appear to
be dissolving today.
127. La Farge, Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the
American Indians, 311 Annals 41, 41-43 (1957) ; Hawley, Some Factors in the Indian
Problem in New Mexico 14-16 (1948); Cohen, op. cit. supra note 95, at 149; Havigburst, Education Among American Indians, 311 Annals 105, 109 (1957) ; Dozier,
Simpson & Yinger, Integration of Americans of Indian Decent, 311 Annals 158, 161,
(1957) ; Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit. supra note 103, at 21, 30, 41, 43, 55.
See note 18 supra. In the 1965 Hearings on S. 961-68, leaders of larger Western
tribes expressed concern that the treatment of a tribe as an agency of the federal
government would interfere unduly with customary methods of tribal administration
and cause unnecessary conformity. 1965 Hearings on 8. 961-68, supra note 76, at 104,
(Hopis), at 190 (United Pueblos), at 234 (Crows), at 256 (Yakimas), at 328 (Pimas),
at 340 (Mescaleros) ; Navajo Times, Feb. 24, 1966, p. 23. Leaders of smaller and less
cohesive Indian groups tended to react more favorably to the bill. 1965 Hearings on
8. 961-68, supra note 76, at 348-50, 356.
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"Americanization" of specific tribal institutions. And on a deeper
level, the end objective of "Americanizing" is itself not immune
from questions.
A final consideration is the place of cultural diversity within the
larger national society. The severity with which constitutional restrictions come to be applied to Indian governments inextricably
affects the extent to which Indian groups are able to continue to
distinguish their own values from the values of the masses around
them. To some people, perhaps, the democratic ideal consists of
eliminating distinctions among social groups and that uniformity
makes for greater equality. To others, however, removing the lines
between social classes, as opposed to economic classes, poses a substantial threat to diversity of custom and in turn to diversity of
thought as well. The existence of a diversity among groups of
people with their separate ways of living may provide a mature
society with a wellspring for the future growth of civilized ideas.
For the individual it may provide a source of identification and
life-meaning in an unordered modern world. Thus, uniformity, may
pose a deadening threat to democracy. The problem in the end is
how the social and religious mores in an Indian community are
properly related to American political mores once the label of
"community rule" is replaced by "tribal government."
CONCLUSION

The nature of the Indian tribal entity requires a large amount of
flexibility when its actions come under review by a non-Indian court.
Treatment of a tribe as a "state" for purposes of applying ad hoc
considerations of due process is the method best suited for allowing flexibility. Non-Indian courts must distinguish between (1) the
arbitrary action by an official acting only under color of tribal law,
and (2) a valid exercise of the tribal police power. Considerations
which go to validate use of the police power differ between tribes
as they do between a tribe and a state. To delineate these considerations means posing the ultimate question of how far constitutional
guarantees of individual freedom can allow for the continuation of
ethnic communities whose way of life places group harmony above
individual dissention.

